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INTRODUCTION.
This paper will discuss the origin and development of the
reservation doctrine, describe the various legislative attempts
to limit or abolish the doctrine, and discuss its current
status and implementation. The paper will concentrate on the
NonIndian aspects of the doctrine.
The reservation doctrine inspires anger, fear, disdain, and
occasionally eloquence:
Corker.
It is the product of a fabricated legislative history. It is
a perversion and a fabrication."
Corker, A REAL LIVE
PROBLEM OR TWO FOR THE WANING ENERGIES OF FRANK J. TRELEASE,
54 Den. L. J. 499, 500 (1977).
Trelease.
"Cyprinodon diabolis, The Devil's Hole pupfish is alive and
well and living in a striated marble palace in Nevada,
located within a small addition to the Death Valley National
Monument created for his benefit in 1952. 1% The reserved
rights doctrine "is very like the Devil's Hole pupfish in
many ways. It too is an evolutionary sport. It too lives in
Devil's hole. It too has friends in high places within the
federal bureaucracy and judicial system." Trelease, FEDERAL
RESERVED WATER RIGHTS SINCE PLLRC, 54 Den. L. J. 473 (1977).
Goldberg.
Described the relationship between western water law,
including the reservation doctrine, and federalism as a
"concoction of Byzantine politics and legalistic
archaeology." Goldberg, INTERPOSITION--WILD WEST WATER
STYLE, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 36 (1964).
Commenting on westerner's criticism of the doctrine, and of
federal bureaucracy generally, he said: "This sort of
fulmination is well within the tradition that permits the

Westerner to "blast at an all-consuming federal encroachment
in words more blistering than all the winds that blow from
Spokane to San Antonio" in unconcerned disregard of the
historical fact "that from start to finish he was [federally]
subsidized from his brogans to his sombrero. . . ".
Goldberg, id. at 1.
Ely.
The reservation doctrine is a "first mortgage of undetermined
and indeterminable magnitude," is a "sword of damocles"
hanging over private water rights. Ely. Address to National
Water Commission, Nov. 6, 1969. Reported in 54 Den. L. J. at
475 (1977).
Hanks.
The impact of the reservation doctrine could be "staggering
indeed": "In 16 western states, the BIA administers
52,307,036 acres; a total of 138,595,360 are included in
national forests, which are reserved areas, in the
reclamation states. Approximately 85% of the entire state of
Nevada is owned by the US. Of the 60 million acres of
federal land in Nevada, 12 million acres are reserved lands.
In Arizona, approximately 73 percent of all land is owned by
the federal government." Hanks, PEACE WEST OF THE 98TH
MERIDIAN--A SOLUTION TO FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICTS OVER WESTRN
WATERS, 23 Rutgers L. Rev. 33,43 (1968).
Johnson.
Commenting on US v. New Mexico: "If you think that you can
think about a thing (that thing being the purposes for which
water was reserved under the Forest Service Organic Act in
1897) and that thing is inextricably attached to something
else (the something else being the Reserved Rights Doctrine)
without thinking of the thing to which it is attached to
(which, of course, is the Reserved Rights Doctrine, which you
can't think about because it didn't exist in 1897) then you
have a legal mind. Or at least you may be qualified to sit
on the Supreme Court!"
Inst. for Nat. Res. Law Teachers,
Boulder Colo., May 28, 1981. Adapted from saying by Thomas
Reed Powell.

THE ORIGIN OF THE RESERVATION DOCTRINE
Disagreement on the date of origin of the doctrine.
The earliest cited case on the doctrine is United States v. Rio
Grande Irrigation Co. 174 US 690 (1899), where the court said,
per dicta, "(A] state cannot by its legislation destroy the

right of the United States, as owner of the land bordering on a
stream, to the continued flow of its waters, so far at least as
may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government
property." Id. at 703.
In Winters v. United States, 207 US 564 (1908) the Court
recognized reserved rights in an Indian Tribe even though
nothing had been said in the Agreement with the Indians about
water. The Court relied on Rio Grande for the proposition that
"The power of the Government to reserve the waters and exempt
them from appropriation under the state laws is not denied, and
could not be."
Samuel Weil, in his treatise WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES
(Bancroft-Whitney, 1911), says there are "divergent theories
regarding the law of waters . . . on military and Indian
reservations. . . .
But the general tendency of the Federal courts in dealing with
water on or used by military or Indian reservations is to . . .
tacitly assume that the creation of the reservation impliedly
repealed the act of 1866 as to waters thereon; and to restore
the proprietary rights of the Unites States, . . . not limited
to the amount of water in actual use at any specific time."
"Military and Indian reservations are in exclusive government
occupancy, wherein they may possibly differ from the forest and
other reserved areas, which are intended to be open to the
people." (Sec. 207).
The state's rights argument. This position argues that three
acts, the Act of 1866, 1870, and 1877, constituted waivers of
federal reserved rights claims . This argument seemed to be
confirmed in California Oregon Power Co. v. Portland Beaver
Cement Co., 295 US 142 (1935) where the court said:
[The Desert Land Act] effected a severance of all water on
the public domain, not theretofore appropriated, from the
land itself. . . Congress intended to establish the rule
that for the future the land should be patented separately;
and that all nonnavigable waters thereon should be reserved
for the use of the public under the laws of the states and
territories. . . " 295 US at 162.
FPC v. Oregon, 349 US 435 (1955), alerted western lawyers to
the possibility that the reserved rights doctrine might apply
to NonIndian reserves, although no actual allocation of water
was made in the case. The Court denied Oregon's claim of
ownership of a nonnavigable stream, saying that the three above
acts did not constitute a severance of waters as to federally
"withdrawn" lands, and then held that a federally licensed
project could go forward over state objections.

Arizona v. California, 373 US 546 (1963), firmly held that the
reservation doctrine applied to NonIndian, reserved public
lands, and the court allocated water to such reserved lands,
41,839 acre-feet per year for the Havasu Lake National Wildlife
Refuge, and 28,000 acre-feet per year for the Imperial National
Wildlife Refuge, both with 1941 priorities.
EXPECTATIONS DASHED
The western water establishment cried "unfair" after FPC v.
Oregon and Arizona v. California, arguing that these cases
destroyed legitimate expectations of prior appropriators.
Trelease, debunking the claim that the doctrine originated with
Rio Grande in 1899, and Winters in 1908, argued:
"I was there. I took a course in water law in 1938 and got
an A in it. I then went to work for L. Ward Bannister, one
of the negotiators of the Colorado River Compact and lecturer
in water law at Denver University and Harvard University. I
helped to bring his notes up to date. I listened in on
discourses he had with Ralph Carr, Jean Breitenstein, John
Reed, and other "irrigation lawyers" of the old school. I
started to teach water law in 1946, and I was General Counsel
for the Missouri River Basin Survey Commission in 1952. At
no time prior to 1955 did I ever hear a suggestion that the
reserved rights doctrine was anything but a special quirk of
Indian water law." Trelease, FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
SINCE PLLRC, 54 Den. L. J. 473 (1977).
WESTERN WATER RIGHTS SETTLEMENT BILLS
Starting in 1955 and for the next 15 years, over 50 bills were
introduced in Congress to reverse the effects of the
reservation doctrine.
Four principal objections were raised to the doctrine.
(1) The federal government, rather than the states, decides
how the water is to be used.
(2) The federal government does not follow state filing
procedures, impairing the completeness of the state's water
records. No centralized federal record system exists for
reserved water rights.
(3) Reserved rights are unquantified, creating uncertainty
and making long range planning impossible.
(4) Prior appropriators under state law can lose their
rights to preexisting, unquantified, unrecorded,

undiscoverable federal reserved rights.
THE FIRST BILLS
The first bills were introduced by Senator Barrett. Their
central theme was that "All unnappropriated water in the 17
western states is declared to be free for appropriation under
state law" (See Corker, WATER RIGHTS AND FEDERALISM, 45 Cal. L.
Rev. 604,606 (1957)) and to require the United States to comply
with state appropriation laws rather than claiming waters under
the reservation doctrine.
LATER BILLS
Most of the bills introduced over the ensuing years dealt not
only with the reserved rights issue, but also with the
compensation question under the navigation servitude. In
general they proposed that compensation be required for the
loss of private property rights under the reservation doctrine
and the navigation servitude, that the federal government be
required to comply with state water law when it buildsprojects
under the Reclamation Act of 1902, and that FPC licensees be
required to comply with state law when they build projects
under the Federal Power Act of 1920.
Various compromises were developed, under Senator Kuchel of
California and others. None of these bills ultimately passed.
See, Hanks, PEACE WEST OF THE 98TH MERIDIAN--A SOLUTION TO
FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICTS OVER WESTERN WATERS" 23 Rutgers L. Rev.
33 (1968).
REPORT OF THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION. (One Third of
the Nation's Land, 1970) 147-149. For commentary, see
Trelease, WATER RESOURCES ON THE PUBLIC LANDS: PLLRC's
SOLUTION TO THE RESERVATION DOCTRINE, 6 Land and Water Law
Review 89 (1970); Muys, COMMENTS ON "FEDERAL RESERVED WATER
RIGHTS", 54 Den. L. J. 493 (1977).
The Commission recommended:
(1) Require federal agencies to give notice of their
projected water requirements for the next 40 years;
(2) Establish administrative or judicial review of the
reasonableness of the quantities claimed by the federal
agencies;
(3) For reservations created in the future, require express
statement of intent to reserve water, and the quantity
reserved;

(4) Require compensation for the taking of water rights
vested prior to the 1963 decision in Arizona v. California.

NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION REPORT (Water Policies for the
Future, 1973) pp. 467-468.
The Commission took a different approach from the PLLRC. It
recommended:
(1) Require federal agencies to give notice of their
projected water requirements for the next 40 years.
As to existing uses by federal agencies, the agencies would
be entitled to priority as of the date of the original
reservation of the federal lands.
Future uses would receive a priority date as of the date of
initiation of actual use.
Compensation would be required where existing private water
uses were displaced by new federal agency uses.
REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT LEGISLATION
(1)

Eastern suspicion of western avarice.

"The Wild West water version of interposition . . .: not
only should the [western] states have the right to do as
they please, but they should be able to do it with federal
property, and at federal expense." Goldberg, 17 Stan. L.
Rev. 1, 3 (1964).
(2) Rising influence of the environmental movement.
Reserved rights tend to protect instream flows, forests,
wildlife, and environmental interests.
(3) Splits in western water politics in the 1960s, e.g.,
over the proposed diversion of Columbia River water to the
Southwest, and over the continuation of the 160 acre
limitation.
(4) Enactment of Sec. 111 Rivers and Harbors Act, 1970, 33
USC Sec. 595a, reversing United States v. Rands, 389 US 121
(1967), and United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 US 222
(1956) and providing that when condemnation occurs,
compensation must be paid to riparians on navigable waters
for the "highest and best use" of their uplands, unburdened
by the navigation servitude. This excised one of the major
problems addressed by proposed settlement legislation.

(5) The Supreme Court's interpretation of the McCarran
Amendment, 66 Stat. 560, 43 USC Sec. 666 to constitute waiver
of sovereign immunity for suits in federal or state courts to
adjudicate, and quantify, federal reserved water rights.
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
US 800 (1976), United States v. District Court for Eagle
County, 401 US 520 (1971).
(6) The fact that no one could be found whose vested water
right had been destroyed by the exercise of a federal
reserved right.
The PLLRC reported that "The federal lands are the
source of most of the water in the 11 coterminous western
states, providing approximately 61% of the total natural
runoff occurring in the region. Most of this runoff comes
from land withdrawn or reserved for specific purposes.
Forest Service and National Park Service reservations
contribute about 88 % and 8 %, respectively, of the runoff
from public lands and more than 59 % of the total yield from
all lands of those states." ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND,
Final Report of the PLLRC, p. 141, 1970.
The PLLRC reported, however, that "Although most of the
current concern relates to the doctrine's potential future
impact, such potential impacts could be major". Id. at 144.
In 1964 Nicolas B. Katzenbach, Deputy Attorney General for
the US said that
"for all the outcry. . . not one state, not one county, not
one municipality, not one irrigation district, not one
corporation, not one individual has come forward to plead and
prove that the United States. . . has destroyed any private
right." Hearings on S. 1275 Before the Subcommittee on
Irrigation and Reclamation of the Senate Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong. 2nd. Sess. (1964). Trelease
reported that "Twenty-two years after Pelton Dam this is
still true." Trelease, 54 Den. L. J. at p. 492 (1977).
Corker, commenting on the "de minimus" quantity of reserved
rights as to NonIndian lands, noted that
"It is the quantity beneath the accuracy of a stream guage.
It is what a bird, a butterfly, a deer, or a backpacker
drinks from a stream without need of permission. [This
statement was made prior to US v. New Mexico; not even these
minimal drinkers would now be protected]. The rest of the
water flows from the National Forests and the National Parks
subject to the law of gravity." Corker, 54 Den. L. J. 499
(1977).
Professor Corker, after extensive research on a report for the

PLLRC, finally found an "injured" person. Mrs. Glenn sued
under the Tort Claims Act for loss of a 1930 irrigation
appropriation to a recreation area in a National Forest
established in 1897. Her suit was dismissed on stipulated
facts. Apparently sufficient water was made available for both
Mrs. Glenn and the Forest Service. See Glenn v. United States,
Civil No. C-153-61 (D. Utah march 16, 1963) discussed in
DEVELOPMENT, MANAGEMENT AND USE OF WATER RESOURCES ON THE
PUBLIC LANDS, by Wheatley, Corker, Stetson, and Reed.
Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technical Information
of the Dept. of Corn., PB 188 065 & 188 066. See also, Corker,
LET THERE NO NAGGING DOUBTS: NOR SHALL PRIVATE PROPERTY,
INCLUDING WATER RIGHTS, BE TAKEN FOR PUBLIC USE WITHOUT JUST
COMPENSATION, 6 Land & Water L. R. 109 (1970)

THE DEVIL'S HOLE PUPFISH
While this case is cited for the implied reservation doctrine,
it really belongs in the express reservation category. In
Cappaert v. United States, 426 US 128 (1976) the court enjoined
an irrigator's groundwater pumping which was lowering the level
of water in Devil's Hole, and endangering the spawning grounds
of the tiny pupfish. A 1952 Presidential Proclamation had
expressly reserved this water for the pupfish. The court
adopted a rule of "minimal need" to effectuate the
reservation's purposes, saying it applied to both express and
implied reservations.
The use of this reserved water did not interfere with an
"existing" private appropriation right. The creation of the
federal reservation clearly pre-dated the planned private use,
and the water-related purpose of the reservation was clearly
expressed.
THE GILA NATIONAL FOREST
In United States v. New Mexico, 238 US 696 (1978), the Court
upheld federal reserved rights for National Forest lands. The
United States claimed reserved rights for minimum instream
flows, and for recreational, stockwatering, and fish purposes.
But the Court said it would recognize only "primary" purposes
under the National Forest Organic Act of 1897, 16 USC Secs.
473-478, 479-82, 551 (1976). These purposes did not include
recreation, aesthetics, wildlife-preservation, or cattle
grazing which the court called secondary purposes. They only
include securing favorable conditions of water flows, and
furnishing a continuous supply of timber for the people.
A second issue in New Mexico was whether the Multiple Use
Sustained Yield Act of 1960, P.L. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215.

C

codified as amended at 16 USC Secs 528-531 (1976), reserved
additional waters. The Court held not, saying that although
Congress intended the forests to be administered for broader
purposes after 1960, Congress did not intend to reserve water
for secondary, MUSYA purposes.
Some 16 or 17 Articles and Notes appeared on the New Mexico
case. See, e.g. "Water Rights and National Forests--Narrowing
the Implied Reservation Doctrine: United States v. New Mexico,
40 Ohio State Law Journal 728 (1979); Boles, Jr. and Elliott,
"United States v. New Mexico and the Course of Federal Reserved
Water Rights, 51 Colo. L. Rev. 209 (1980); Fairfax & Tarlock,
No Water for the Woods: A Critical Analysis Of United States
v. New Mexico, 15 Ida. L. Rev. 509 (1979).
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UNITED STATES v. CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, 656 P. 2d 1 (Colo.
1982). (Not appealed) This case is the most extensive
implementation of the reservation doctrine to date and deserves
careful attention.
In this complex state-court adjudication the United States
submitted claims for reserved water rights covering seven
national forests, three national monuments, one national park,
over 1500 public waterholes and springs, two mineral hot
springs, and the public domain administered by the Bureau of
Land Management. The case involved thousands of claims for
state law appropriation rights. 169 parties objected to the US
claims, represented by at least 70 different attorneys. A
Water Court decree was appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court.
That court held:
NATIONAL FORESTS
Instream flows for recreational, scenic and wildlife purposes.
The United States claimed instream flow rights for watershed
and timber protection, and wanted to use this water for
recreational, scenic, and wildlife protection.
HELD: Instream flow claim rejected. The US failed to
demonstrate that this water was needed for national forest
purposes of watershed protection and timber production.
Does MUSYA expand reservation purposes? The United States
claimed that MUSYA (1960) expanded the purposes for which
water could be reserved under the 1897 Act.
While
HELD: MUSYA did not expand these purposes.
conceding the Supreme Court's statement in New Mexico was
dicta, the Colorado Court said that the dicta was controlling.
Congress was aware of the Reserved Rights Doctrine when it
passed MUSYA, but did not choose to reserve additional water
explicitly.
DINOSAUR NATIONAL MONUMENT
Reservations for Monuments. The US claimed reserved instream
flows in the Yampa River for recreational boating (river
rafting) within the Monument. This have seriously impaired
junior appropriators upstream on the Yampa. This National
Monument was created under 16 USC Sec. 431 (1976) by
presidential proclamation to preserve public lands of
outstanding historic and scientific interest. President Wilson
created it in 1915 to preserve an "extraordinary deposit of
Dinosaurian and other gigantic reptilian remains".
HELD: Recreational boating is not one of the purposes for
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which water can be reserved under the National Monument Act.
Monument transferred to Park. This Monument was placed under
the supervision of the National Park Service in 1938 and the US
argued that its "purposes" were thus expanded to include
National Park purposes.
HELD: The transfer was done for administrative convenience
and did not change the purposes for which water could be
reserved. The area is still a Monument, being administered by
the National Park Service.
Instream flows for scientifically important species. The US
claimed instream flows might be necessary for fish habitats of
endangered species of historic and scientific interest.
HELD: Claim upheld. REMANDED for determination of
quantity needed for these purposes. The US must quantify its
claim within 6 months.

ROCKY MOUNTAIN NATIONAL PARK
National Forest transferred to Park status. This Park was
created from a national forest. The land was transferred to
the Park in 1915, and again in 1930.
HELD: For reservation purposes that are common to both
national forests and national parks (watershed protection and
timber production), the priority date is the initial national
forest reservation.
National Parks also have broader purposes, inter alia,
conserving scenery, historic and scientific objects, and
wildlife. See National park Service Act of 1916, 16 USC Sec. 1
(1976). The priority date for the reserved rights for these
broader purposes is the date the land was made into a Park.
Decrees were awarded for minimum flows and lake levels for
conservation of scenic, natural and historic objects and for
recreational and aesthetic purposes.

PUBLIC SPRINGS AND WATERHOLES
Reservation by Interior Dept. regulation. The federal
government claimed reserved water rights for the entire yield
of numerous waterholes and springs, whether tributary or
nontributary, located on lands withdrawn by a 1926 executive
order titled "Public Water Reserve No. 107".
HELD: The Executive Order was issued under authority of
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the Stock Raising Homestead Act of 1916, 43 USC Sec. 300
(1976). While the Exec. Order did not state an intention to
reserve water and withdraw it from appropriation under state
law, Department of Interior regulations did state such
intention, and that is adequate to create a reserved right.
Anti-monopolization purpose for reservation. The Dept. of
Interior REGULATIONS reserved water to "prevent the
monopolization of vast land areas in the arid states by
providing a source of drinking water for animal and human
consumption".
HELD: These regulations reserved only sufficient water to
carry out this anti-monopolization purpose, and no more. The
springs and water holes contain more water than is minimally
essential for this purpose. The government has 4 years to
quantify its minimal needs to effectuate this purpose.
Tributary springs. The reservation applies to both tributary
and nontributary springs; the reservation documents made no
distinction between these two types of sources.

MINERAL HOT SPRINGS
Reservation for leasing purposes. The federal government
claimed reserved water rights to hot springs for leasing
purposes pursuant to the Pickett Act (43 USC Sec. 141 (1976).
HELD: Reserved rights upheld.
Reservation for geothermal power production. The federal
government claimed reserved water rights to hot springs for
geothermal power production, under the Pickett Act, and under
the Geothermal Steam Act of 1970, 30 USC Sec. 1001, et seq.
(1976).
HELD: No reserved rights. The Geothermal Act is
principally a leasing Act. No express or implied intent can be
found in either Act to reserve water for power generation.
Federal licensees and contractors exercising reserved right.
The federal government claimed that permittees, licensees, and
concessionaires could exercise the federal reserved right, and
that it was not necessary for the federal government to itself
exercise these rights.
HELD: Licensees etc. can exercise the federal reserved
right.
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TWO OTHER ISSUES were expressly not decided by the court:
(1) whether reserved rights are limited to waters on, under, or
touching the reserved lands;
(2) Whether the reserved right can be transferred to a use
not within the original purposes of the reservation. These
issues were not properly before the court.

RESERVED WATERS ON BLM LANDS
In Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C.Cir.1981) the Court
denied the Sierra Club's claim that FLPMA had reserved waters
on BLM lands for "scenic, scientific, historical, ecological,
environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and
archaeological values", ruling that FLPMA merely set forth
"purposes, goals and authority for uses of the public domain,"
and did not reserve any water.
THEORETICAL BASIS FOR THE RESERVATION DOCTRINE
This topic is considered last in this outline, or almost so,
because it is a peculiar concern of academics, rather than the
courts. The Courts have been concerned with results, letting
theoretical bases take the hindmost. Nonetheless two theories
hold some sway. Supporters of each theory claim judicial
support:
(1) The federal government owns waters on lands that have been
withdrawn, and therefore can do with those waters as it
pleases, without regard to state law. See Hanks, FEDERAL-STATE
RIGHTS AND RELATIONS, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS Sec. 102.1,
at 38-40 (R. Clark ed. Supp 1978).
(2) The reservation doctrine is explained by the supremacy
clause, coupled with some incidental constitutional power (e.g.
commerce power) exercised on the reserved land. See F.
Trelease, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW 138-47
(National Water Commission Legal Study No. 5, 1971).

FEDERAL NON-RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
The argument about the existence of these oddities, and what they
look like, has preoccupied a number of federal lawyers and
academics. To date the courts have not been concerned with them.
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If one cuts through the extensive verbiage on the subject, one
thing seems clear. If Congress wants to claim waters for some
federal government use, then it has the power to do so,
assuming it acts under the Supremacy clause in conjunction with
some other empowering clause, e.g., commerce or property. Of
course if the federal use damages or destroys vested private
water rights, the the owners of those rights, must be
compensated. In view of past congressional history (e.g., the
Acts of 1866, 1877), and Supreme Court cases (e.g., US V. New
Mexico) the Congressional intention to claim such waters will
have to be clearly expressed. But, that the power exists is
not really be debatable.
Debate can, of course, occur about whether the Congressional
intent is clear enough to pass judicial muster. That debate,
especially as it concerns the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, 43 USC Sec. 1701 et seq. (FLPMA) has
waxed extensively in the federal legal establishment since
1979. See:
Krulitz view: Such rights probably exist under FLPMA, and
other statutes, and, indeed, are not all that hard to find.
FEDERAL WATER RIGHTS OF THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERVICE, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, AND BUREAU OF LAND
MANAGEMENT, 88 Interior Dec. 553 (1979).
Martz view: Such rights probably don't exist, and certainly
not unless clearly mandated by Congress; FLPMA is too fuzzy to
MEMORANDUM OF THE SOLICITOR OF
be the basis of such rights.
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, 88 Interior Dec. 253 (1981).
Coldiron view: "There is no 'federal non-reserved water
right.'" NON-RESERVED WATER RIGHTS--UNITED STATES COMPLIANCE
WITH STATE LAW, 88 Interior Dec. 1055 (1981).
Olson view (Office of Legal Counsel): Such rights might well
exist, but only where congress explicitly or clearly provides
for them! U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Leg. Counsel, "Federal NonReserved" Water Rights (June 16, 1982).

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RESERVED RIGHTS AND NON-RESERVED
RIGHTS?
Coggins and Wilkinson suggest that non-reserved rights arise
when Congress delegates to a federal agency authority to
administratively claim the waters of a particular stream or
lake, for a particular location and purpose, e.g., a campsite.
These rights have a priority from the date "the public was
given notice, probably through rulemaking." G.C. Coggins, C.
F. Wilkinson, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW, 1983
Supp. p. 70.
FINIS

